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INTRODUCTION
For decades, state courts have participated in lawsuits alleging that the
school finance systems in their jurisdictions are unconstitutional under state
education clauses. Since 1989, plaintiffs have prevailed in twenty out of twenty-
nine of these lawsuits.' As a result, courts have had the opportunity to pro-
nounce sweeping financial remedies to address the constitutional violations.
Whether or not these lawsuits have been beneficial to children is debatable.
Two recent books-Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses,2 by Eric Ha-
nushek and Alfred Lindseth, and Courts & Kids,3 by Michael Rebell-provide
different perspectives on the issue. This Review describes and analyzes the most
critical differences between the authors' arguments.
In Part I, this Review discusses the authors' divergent views on the effec-
tiveness of past judicial remedies in school finance litigation cases. Hanushek
and Lindseth argue that cost-studies, which provide the basis for school finance
remedies, are flawed and that the financial remedies awarded by courts have not
significantly improved student achievement. Rebell, on the other hand, holds
an optimistic view of cost studies and believes that student achievement has
been positively impacted by these lawsuits.
These perspectives lay the foundation for Part II, which highlights the au-
thors' respective visions of the role courthouses and statehouses should play in
subsequent school finance reform efforts. Hanushek and Lindseth see a mini-
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mal role for courts in a system of performance-based funding that holds schools
accountable for student outcomes, while Rebell champions accountability
through the courts.
Despite their differences, the authors find common ground on several
fronts. Rebell, Hanushek, and Lindseth are concerned about the educational
achievement of all children. Both sets of authors are worried about human capi-
tal and our nation's ability to compete in a global marketplace.4 And both au-
thors do not believe that simply throwing money at the problem will be effec-
tive.'
Part III attempts to harmonize the authors' proposals by offering a reme-
dial framework in which both courts and legislatures are afforded significant
responsibility over school finance remedies. While legislatures are given sub-
stantial leeway at the outset of a remedy's implementation, this discretion is
subject to students' attaining academic achievement goals set by courts. The
proposed framework ensures legislative accountability while largely vitiating
separation of powers concerns. It sets a clear remedial principle that will guide
legislative decision-making while focusing the attention of future reform efforts
on students.
I. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REMEDIES IN SCHOOL FINANCE
The two books are divided sharply on the effectiveness of judicial remedies
in school finance cases. Because each book's central thesis is premised on an as-
sumption that judicial remedies have-or have not-produced adequate aca-
demic achievement outcomes for children, this Part describes fundamental ten-
sions between the books in two areas: the value of "costing-out" studies that
drive remedial decision-making and the extent to which judicial remedies actu-
ally have improved these academic achievement outcomes.
A. The Value of Costing-Out Studies
When states are sued for providing inadequate or inequitable educational
opportunities under state constitutions, plaintiffs frequently rely on "costing-
out" studies.6 These studies employ professional researchers who use statistical
4. Id. at 6; HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 2, at 1-2 (noting that American stu-
dents are no longer competitive and that they are falling behind children from
other developed nations in international achievement rankings).
5. HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 2, at 6 ("A major impediment to effective
school reform is that financial decisions have historically been separated from
policy decisions about how to improve student outcomes."); REBELL, supra note i,
at 7 ("[Courts] need to make clear that compliance is not just a matter of doing
better or of adding more money but of achieving a concrete end-a sound basic
education-that has specific input and outcome characteristics.").
6. The plaintiffs in the Massachusetts Hancock case, for example, provided cost stud-
ies to the trial court. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COSTRELL, MASSACHUSETTS' HANCOCK
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methodologies to estimate the cost of providing a constitutionally adequate lev-
el of education.
Hanushek and Lindseth devote an entire chapter to critiquing the scientific
validity of these studies.7 Their most fundamental criticism is that the studies do
not ensure funds are spent efficiently.' Because the cost estimates frequently are
based on the professional judgment of survey participants who are encouraged
to "dream big" in constructing an education system, they are equivalent to
"shopping sprees" in which professionals "order everything their hearts desire,
not the minimums actually needed to provide an adequate education."9 The au-
thors also note the arbitrary nature of calculations in the studies,"0 the absurd
results that have emerged from them," and the extremely wide variance in cost
estimates across different states.'2 Finally, Hanushek and Lindseth argue that the
studies do not show that the cost estimates necessarily will result in academic
achievement gains for students.'3
Hanushek and Lindseth present these arguments cogently and forcefully.
14
Rebell agrees with them to some extent, noting that "[c]ost studies, to the max-
imum extent possible, should, of course, base their funding estimates on the
cost of providing services efficiently and in accordance with current best prac-
CASE AND THE ADEQUACY DOCTRINE 9-12 (20o6), available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/rappaport/downloads/finalhancock.pdf (discussing
the professional judgment and successful schools studies presented in Hancock v.
Commissioner of Education, 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005)). In Missouri, the Mis-
souri Education Coalition for Adequacy (MECA) released the results of a cost
study in 2003 prior to litigation efforts in Committee for Educational Equality v.
State, 294 S.W.3d 477 (Mo. 2009). See Nat'l Access Network, Missouri Costing-
Out Study Finds $913 Million More Is Needed (Oct. 23, 2003),
http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/mo/lo-23-o3costingout.php3.
7. HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 2, at 171-216.
8. Id. at 173.
9. Id. at 178-79. Hanushek and Lindseth also point out that the participants who
serve on the panels and help the researchers to estimate costs are themselves edu-
cators, so this fact furthers their bias toward providing more funding. Id. at 18o.
10. Id. at 189 (discussing the "weightings" that should be added to funding formulas
for at-risk and special needs students).
11. Id. at 183 (noting that "a study concluded that an average increase in funding of
$4,874 per student was needed in Missouri's top twenty-five performing school
districts, compared to only $2,551 in its twenty-five lowest performing districts").
12. Id. at 198.
13. Id. at 173.
14. Whatever Hanushek and Lindseth wish to say about the unreliable nature of cost
studies, however, these studies are frequently commissioned-outside the context
of litigation-by state governments seeking to reshape their own school finance
systems.
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tices."'5 Regardless of these studies' methodological flaws, however, Rebell con-
tends that the transparency of costing-out procedures represents a "vast im-
provement over past practices under which funding allocations were often de-
termined through backroom political deals and had no bearing on actual costs
or student need."'
6
Rebell also notes the important role courts have played to ensure the integ-
rity of costing-out studies. Courts, in his view, should embrace this role as they
did in Ohio and Texas, where the judiciary unearthed biases and methodologi-
cal flaws in costing-out studies.17 Although the studies are not perfect, he argues
that judicial oversight has "provided guidance to the development of practice in
the field as a whole."'8 Thus, courts will, on Rebell's account, facilitate the im-
provement of these studies over time. This point is one of pure disagreement
among the authors, as Hanushek and Lindseth believe that improvement in
studies is facilitated more appropriately by "the continuing dialog within disci-
plines, the scientific peer review system, and the mores of science work." 9 For
them, the judicial process "lacks scientific checks and balances."2" As this Re-
view argues in Part III, there is merit to both books' arguments. Although the
studies have their methodological faults and should not be a primary engine of
reform efforts, there is a point at which costing-out studies may be employed
usefully to guide legislatures that have been ineffective at implementing school
finance reforms.
B. Student Achievement Outcomes
Does money matter? According to Hanushek and Lindseth, it does, but on-
ly if the money is spent efficiently and used for programs that are shown em-
pirically to improve student achievement.' Building on their arguments about
costing-out studies and the inefficient spending that results from their applica-
tion, Hanushek and Lindseth paint a picture of remedial outcomes resulting
from school finance suits that have failed schoolchildren.
Tracing the student achievement test scores of students in Kentucky,
Wyoming, New Jersey, and Massachusetts-the four states with the longest
court-ordered remedies in place-Hanushek and Lindseth attempt to demon-
15. REBELL, supra note i, at 66.
16. Id. at 65.
17. Id at 66. But see id. at 67 (criticizing the New York Court of Appeals for failing to
review a thorough record regarding allegations of improper weightings and ma-
nipulations of a cost study).
18. Id. at 66.
19. HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 2, at 212.
20. Id. at 213.
21. See id. at 57 (noting that "money, if spent appropriately, can have a significant ef-
fect").
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strate the overall ineffectiveness of judicial remedies.22 They show that, from
1992 to 2007, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) achieve-
ment scores in those states did not grow much more than achievement scores in
the nation as a whole. 3 These comparisons show-with the exception of Mas-
sachusetts-that states implementing judicial remedies have not realized aca-
demic gains as great as one would hope 4
Even though Hanushek and Lindseth's methodology is fairly simplistic,25
Rebell's response to this analysis is largely unsatisfying. He also refers to NAEP
score increases in Massachusetts as well as some additional increases in New
Jersey, but he does not illustrate how these score increases were an independent
result of judicial remedies 6.2 Although Rebell effectively argues that "test score
measures ... cannot.., serve as the sole or even the major indicator of the suc-
cess or failure of a judicial intervention," 27 he does not present any other types
of empirical evidence to illustrate that court-ordered remedies have been suc-
cessful. Just as Hanushek and Lindseth fail to provide a meaningful alternative
to costing-out studies in their critique, Rebell fails to provide a meaningful al-
ternative method of assessing judicial remedies.
But Rebell likely would argue that he does not necessarily need to provide a
purely scientific measure of remedial success. Although outcome indicators
such as increased spending on education or higher test scores are important,
provision of a sound basic education, to him, is about something more. 8 Re-
bell's conception of a remedy's success depends on a more subjective judgment.
In particular, judges should look beyond "inherently limited" indicators of stu-
dent outcomes and instead consider whether their remedy furthers "the effec-
tive use of the standards, resources, and other inputs into the [education] sys-
tem and whether the systems in place are likely to prepare students to function
productively in a modern, diverse society." 9 Should courts, as a matter of poi-
22. Id. at 145-70.
23. Id. at 166-70 figs.6.io, 6.11, 6.12, 6.13 & 6.14.
24. Id. at 170.
25. The analysis, for example, largely fails to control for state-by-state differences that
may affect student outcomes irrespective of the court-sponsored interventions.
Hanushek and Lindseth do use state-to-state comparison data to bolster their
findings for Wyoming, however. Id. at 151-57. Their analysis also only considers a
single test score as a measure of educational outcomes. Educational outcomes can
be defined much more broadly, and the analysis may not appropriately measure
other effects of the lawsuit relative to the rest of the nation.
26. REBELL, supra note i, at 35.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 37.
29. Id. at 37-38.
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icy, make these admittedly broad judgments?0 In the next Part, this Review dis-
cusses each book's conception of the institutional roles that statehouses and
courthouses should play in education finance reform.
II. VISIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL ROLES
Based on their distinctive views of how separation of powers and institu-
tional competency determines a framework for meaningful school finance re-
form, the authors maintain very different perspectives on the roles that legisla-
tures and courts should play in future reform efforts.
A. Performance-Based Funding Through State Legislatures
Hanushek and Lindseth largely view school finance as a political question
for the legislature to decide, noting that "[t]he decisions that go into establish-
ing and funding an education system are political and not legal in nature."3'
They are concerned about judicial activism, since, "if the court abuses its power
and intrudes in areas reserved to the other branches, there is no 'check' within
the constitution itself to bring the courts back into the fold."3" Hanushek and
Lindseth also point out that judges are relatively unaccountable for outcomes
relative to legislators. Specifically, judges do not need to answer to the electorate
to the extent legislators do.1
3
Meanwhile, education clauses within state constitutions are "couched in
very general terms" and merely require that the state "provide some form of free
public education."34 Therefore, this right is a narrow one according to Hanushek
and Lindseth. Combining that conception with the fact that financial appro-
priations-including school finance allocations-are typically the legislature's
responsibility under state constitutions,35 it is no surprise that they disagree
sharply with Rebell on the courts' need to regulate this area.
6
30. See infra Part III (critiquing Rebell for mandating court oversight over educa-
tional inputs as well as output results).
31. HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 2, at ioo (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 99. The authors even go so far as to label this "judicial 'tyranny."' Id.
33. See id. at 98.
34. Id. at 95. Some state constitutions' education clauses are very general. See, e.g.,
Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201 ("The Legislature shall, by general law, provide for
the establishment, maintenance and support of free public schools upon such
conditions and limitations as the Legislature may prescribe."). Other state consti-
tutions, however, provide more specific language. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1, cl. 2
("The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational
institutions and services.") (emphasis added).
35. HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 2, at 96.
36. See infra Section II.B.
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Hanushek and Lindseth's primary proposal relies on performance-based
funding. Arguing that "[a]ccountability for performance should be substituted
for restrictions on local decision-making,"3 7 they support a school funding sys-
tem that provides financial rewards to school districts, administrators, and
teachers when student outcomes improve. 8 Unlike current state funding sys-
tems that micromanage local district efforts by allocating funds toward specific
purposes, 9 the authors argue that the state should not define the ground-level
strategies undertaken by individual districts.4' They are optimistic that such a
performance-based system will remove some of the inefficiencies in the current
system, such as those arising from teacher tenure policies.4' Legislatures are best
equipped, according to Hanushek and Lindseth, to implement school finance
reform because "they have the authority to address a wide range of problems"
and the ability to design innovative solutions.4 By including the judiciary,
court-ordered remedies run the risk of adding funds to schools without ensur-
ing higher achievement.43
Hanushek and Lindseth thus believe that courts should have a narrow role
in school finance reform. But they do extol the court's evidence-gathering pow-
er, for when it is used to focus attention on the problems facing schools, poli-
cymakers "will be playing with a full deck and will be more likely to take appro-
priate action to address waste and mismanagement." 44 If courts exercise
jurisdiction and find that a school funding system is unconstitutional, they
"should make specific findings of fact" regarding "mismanagement, waste, inef-
ficiency, and harmful external influences" of the system.45 After doing so, how-
ever, "the court's work is complete, and the fashioning of an appropriate rem-
edy is for the legislative and executive branches. ' '46 Thus, if courts were simply
to declare funding systems unconstitutional and take no further action, Ha-
nushek and Lindseth would be less concerned. The historical record indicates,
37. HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 2, at 218.
38. Note, however, that these financial rewards are on top of a base funding system
that will be provided to districts based on their needs. Id. at 251-60. This base
funding formula, interestingly, faces some of the same challenges as cost studies.
39. See id. at 227 (discussing categorical grants which restrict district funding to spe-
cific purposes).
40. Id. at 226.
41. Id. at 229.
42. Id. at 264.
43. Id. at 266.
44. Id. at 285.
45. Id. at 286.
46. Id. at 287.
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though, that courts have maintained long-term oversight in the past, and this
fact worries them most.
47
B. Comparative Institutional Competence and Court Oversight
Rebell supports a much stronger role for the courts in school finance re-
form. Responding to Hanushek and Lindseth's separation of powers concerns,
Rebell highlights a quote from Martin Redish:
Once we make the initial assumption that judicial review plays a
legitimate role in a constitutional democracy, we must abandon the
political question doctrine, in all of its manifestations. The doctrine in-
herently implies that one or both of the political branches may con-
tinue conduct that could conceivably be found unconstitutional, with-
out any examination or supervision by the judicial branch.
4 s
Thus, even though it is true that a court overstepping its constitutional role may
be engaging in unchecked tyranny, a court that fails to uphold constitutional
principles allows majority coalitions in state legislatures to wield their own form
of tyrannical power.
Rebell also responds to Hanushek and Lindseth's judicial accountability cri-
tique. Federal judges are not directly accountable to the electorate, Rebell con-
cedes, but "thirty-nine of the fifty states elect some or all of their judges either
in garden-variety partisan elections or in a variant of a retention election."
49
Here, Rebell perhaps overreaches. His figure demonstrates that state court
judges are more accountable to the electorate than federal judges, but the reality
is that all judges-federal or state-operate with relatively high degrees of au-
tonomy compared to legislators.50 Rebell in fact admits that courts are "inde-
pendent bod[ies] that are relatively insulated from political pressure."5' He can-
not have his cake and eat it, too.
47. Their argument is more or less an empirical claim, for, although school finance
plaintiffs often argue that they merely seek a judgment on the constitutionality of
the statutory framework governing school finance, plaintiffs subsequently seek
court orders requiring the legislature to increase funding to specific levels. See id.
at 102.
48. REBELL, supra note 1, at 24 (quoting Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the
"Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031, 1059-6o (1984)).
49. Id. at 47.
5o. Cf Phillip L. DuBois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State
Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31, 39 (1986) (suggesting
that the judicial functions of state courts and federal courts differ, which explains
the differential balance between accountability and independence at the state
court level). Additionally, judicial candidates probably are not scrutinized as ex-
tensively by the electorate as legislative candidates.
51. REBELL, supra note 1, at 50 (quoting Aileen Kavanagh, Participation and Judicial
Review: A Reply to Jeremy Waldron, 22 LAw & PHIL. 451, 466-67 (2003)).
28:539 2010
COURTHOUSE, STATEHOUSE, OR BOTH?
Nevertheless, both authors are entitled to their positions on these matters,
and the separation of powers debate between them underscores the divergence
in their normative views about the scope of education clauses in state constitu-
tions. As noted, Hanushek and Lindseth believe that state education clauses are
phrased generally and provide for narrow rights.52 Rebell, in contrast, empha-
sizes that these rights are positive and must be protected affirmatively." Accord-
ing to him, state constitutions' education clauses "contain language that re-
quires the state to provide students with some substantive level of, basic
education."5 4 This statement illustrates his commitment to a belief that the
Brown P5 ideal of equal educational opportunity can be achieved through
courts.
56
Instead of emphasizing the primacy of the legislature, Courts & Kids pro-
poses a school finance reform model that leverages the relative institutional
strengths of each branch of government.57 Based on his past research, Rebell ar-
gues that courts are best equipped to articulate the broad principles that should
govern education remedies, while legislatures and administrative agencies are
best equipped to articulate policies and implementation needs."8 Courts also
possess a degree of "staying power" that legislatures do not enjoy, and this
structure enables the judiciary to provide long-term guidance and commitment
to reaching desired educational goals.
5 9
In summary, Rebell's remedial proposal places the responsibility on courts
to ensure that state legislatures are held accountable for constitutional require-
ments.6 ° Courts play four distinct roles in overseeing the remedial process: (i)
ensuring that states have adopted challenging academic standards; (2) requiring
states to determine the cost of providing an adequate education; (3) guarantee-
ing that states "develo[p] and implemen[t] instructional programs and ac-
countability mechanisms"; and (4) "assess[ing] the extent to which student per-
formance has improved as a result of reform efforts."16 1 Courts do not prescribe
specific policies, but they should review the states' performance as necessary."
52. See supra Section II.A.
53. REBELL, supra note i, at 47.
54. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
55. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. See REBELL, supra note 1, at 3.
57. See id. at 42-55.
58. Id. at 53.
59. Id. at 54-55.
6o. Id. at 56-84.
6. Id. at 57.
62. Id. ("[T]he court should make clear that the legislative and executive branches
will retain the power and duty to develop appropriate policies and practices in
each of these areas," and courts will only "review their performance as necessary
547
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To that end, courts should stand ready to intervene at any point and should
maintain jurisdiction over extended periods of time.6"
III. TOWARD A COMMON VISION
Notwithstanding the authors' viewpoints on the roles institutions should
play in future school finance reform efforts,6 4 Rebell and Hanushek and Lind-
seth ultimately agree in principle that these efforts must ensure accountability
for the educational outcomes of students.65As Part II illustrated, however, Re-
bell believes that courts should oversee accountability, while Hanushek and
Lindseth believe that legislatures should institute their own accountability proc-
esses. This Review considers both proposals somewhat problematic because, al-
though Rebell's proposal ensures judicial oversight of state legislatures, it rests
on a subjective set of remedial principles articulated by judges and thus could
undermine significantly the legislature's ability to determine what resource in-
puts best promote student achievement.66 Hanushek and Lindseth's proposal,
meanwhile, fails to hold legislatures adequately accountable for their policies
regarding public schools. They lend little credence to the base case in which
solitary legislative and executive branch efforts never result in improved educa-
tional outcomes-if the courts do not provide accountability in that case, who
will?
This Review proposes that, after a court declares a school funding system
unconstitutional, courts defer to the legislature-at least initially-and give it
the opportunity to address inadequacies within the current system. The courts'.
articulating specific inefficiencies in the current system, as Hanushek proposes,
or articulating the basic elements of a "sound basic education,"6 7 as Rebell pro-
poses is not inherently problematic. These measures would provide guideposts
for the legislature as it takes its first crack at fashioning a remedy.
to ensure that reasonable efforts are being made and acceptable results are being
achieved.").
63. Id. at 82-83 (noting that courts should make clear that there will be prompt judi-
cial procedures to resolve disputes and that funding litigation requires continued
court involvement).
64. See supra Parts I, II.
65. Compare REBELL, supra note I, at 38 (noting that a constitutionally adequate and
"successful" educational system should be measured, in part, by the presence of
accountability mechanisms that are designed to ensure that programs are properly
implemented and funded on a sustainable long-term basis), with HANUSHEK
& LINDSETH, supra note 2, at 218 ("If the objective is improving outcomes, the sys-
tem should focus on outcomes. Accountability for performance should be substi-
tuted for restrictions on local decision making.").
66. Although Rebell may argue that courts would not set specific policies, the concern
is that their role could devolve into such a policymaking function over time.
67. REBELL, supra note 1, at 37.
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Like Rebell, courts should have a role in which "the magnitude of actual ju-
dicial involvement in the implementation process will depend directly on the
actions-or inactions-of the political branches in a particular state."68 Unlike
Rebell,6 9 however, the extent to which courts exercise ongoing oversight should
depend solely on educational outcomes.7 ' That is, although courts initially may
articulate principles and inputs that serve as the guideposts for the legislature,
they should base subsequent decisions to exert equity power over the state only
on output-based standards. In choosing output-based standards, courts could
look to student scores on statewide tests or on the NAEP. Alternatively, courts
could even set growth goals and target proficiency levels for students and use
those measures to guide their remedial involvement.
The value of this approach is that it sets a clear remedial principle for legis-
latures. ' As Rebell concedes, "[1] ack of judicial resolve and absence of a clear
strategy for judicial oversight are often what provoke resistance." 72 Here, the
strategy is simple: If students achieve outcome goals, legislatures may develop
their own remedies. If students fail to achieve outcome goals, then the court
gradually will wield more equity power, more oversight, and prescribe addi-
tional remedial provisions as needed. Legislatures will know when and why ju-
dicial involvement will occur. Rebell's framework is exceedingly complex and
over-inclusive. If standards, costing-out studies, "effective instructional pro-
grams," and other inputs to the educational system are assessed by courts in ad-
dition to educational outcomes, this process will result in a high degree of sub-
jectivity regarding both the time and manner of future court interventions.
73
This unpredictability should be avoided.
There are other unique benefits to this Review's proposal. Costing-out stu-
dies only would be employed when absolutely necessary. These studies are very
expensive, and, given their scientific flaws and inability to guarantee student
68. Id. at 86.
69. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
70. This Review acknowledges Rebell's concerns that a "sound basic education" may
be something more than that which could be measured by standardized tests.
Tests can be designed, however, to measure comprehensively the skills children
need to operate in a global economy. It may not be a perfect science, but it is one
that will improve over time (just as Rebell argues is true for cost studies).
71. A focus on educational outcomes provides clear, judicially manageable standards.
See Andrew Rudalevige, Adequacy, Accountability, and the Impact of the No Child
Left Behind Act, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL
ADEQUACY 243, 247-48 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007).
72. REBELL, supra note 1, at 87.
73. See, e.g., Joshua Dunn & Martha Derthick, Adequacy Litigation and the Separation
of Powers, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS, supra note 71, at 322, 333 (noting the arbi-
trariness of judicial intervention because courts will invalidate a system when it
simply "strikes the court the wrong way, and it never has to explain precisely why
it is inadequate").
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outcomes, they should be mandated by courts only as a last resort if legislatures
fail to perform. Additionally, this proposal's primary focus on academic out-
comes might ensure that legislatures will focus on programs that improve stu-
dent achievement. By setting clear and simple constitutional goals, courts can
maximize their agenda-setting power,74 which will allow them to realize the
benefits of the interbranch dialogue that Rebell proposes.75
Due to its strong focus on court oversight based on educational outcomes,
there are admittedly two critiques to this Review's proposal. First, one could ar-
gue that student outcomes do not reflect an appropriate legal standard for
gauging educational adequacy under state constitutions. Hanushek and Lind-
seth allude to this concern!76 At least one state supreme court, however, has ac-
knowledged directly that education outputs can provide an appropriate legal
standard under state constitution education clauses.7 This critique also fails to
acknowledge that state legislatures themselves-the very bodies that Hanushek
and Lindseth seek to protect from judicial intrusion-are the institutions that
set statewide proficiency standards. To the extent that state legislatures formally
adopt state proficiency standards (and all have in some form since the passage
of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)7S)-there is a legal basis for such anal-
ysis.
A second critique of this Review's proposal is that it could promote a "race
to the bottom" among state legislatures in setting achievement standards, that
is, lowering academic output goals to minimize the risk of constitutional liabil-
ity. Although this problem has manifested to some extent in the years since
74. DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDU-
CATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 171 (2001) ("By remaining focused on goals and out-
comes, without dictating means, judges simultaneously respect the policy-making
authority of legislators and executives and increase the likelihood that the legisla-
ture will take the decision seriously.").
75. Once courts declare remedial principles, Rebell advocates a dialogic inquiry be-
tween the political branches and a process of public engagement to promote re-
form. REBELL, supra note 1, at 87-97. Rebell is correct in claiming that courts
should articulate their public values, but the public value should be far less com-
plex than what he proposes.
76. HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 2, at 104 ("For judges sympathetic to extend-
ing Brown but troubled by the vagueness of the education clauses, the standards-
based reform movement in education has served as the missing link to judicial in-
tervention.") (emphasis added).
77. See, e.g., Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. Kansas, 885 P.2d 1170, 1186 (Kan. 1994) (indi-
cating that "the court will not substitute its judgment of what is 'suitable', but will
utilize as a base the standards enunciated by the legislature and the state depart-
ment of education").
78. The Education Commission of the States has a No Child Left Behind Database
that lists the relevant NCLB implementation statutes of each state. See Education
Commission of the States, NCLB Database, http://nclb2.ecs.org/NCLBSURVEY/
NCLB.aspx?Target=SS (last visited July 1, 2010).
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NCLB's passage,7 9 where states are under pressure to achieve complete profi-
ciency by 2014, the fact that some states are settling for low academic standards
is becoming increasingly apparent8s As this trend continues, it is more likely
that legislators will be politically accountable for holding students to low expec-
tations. Additionally, although courts would not assess the constitutionality of
inputs to education systems under this proposal, they would be able to assess
the constitutionality of output-based standards. Based on how a particular state
supreme court interprets the scope of its jurisdiction's right to an education,
courts could gauge whether or not the standards, if met, would prepare stu-
dents adequately to be "capable citizens and productive workers" in an increas-
ingly global world."' Alternatively, it could ensure that students are on the path
to being "college and career-ready."'"2
CONCLUSION
Both Courts & Kids and Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses contrib-
ute significantly to the limited literature on school finance remedies. Hanushek
and Lindseth remain pessimistic about the role of courts in school finance re-
form but are optimistic that school finance systems that hold school districts
accountable for outcomes will provide a strong impetus for future legislative
reform efforts across the nation. Rebell is less optimistic about legislative action
and identifies a broader role for courts, for he is confident that legislative solu-
tions will be effective only if they are guided by the courts' employment of
strong remedial principles and oversight. Neither book's proposal is perfect,
and this Review argues for a compromise solution. To the extent that the pro-
posals are not mutually exclusive, however, ideas from both books likely will be
79. See, e.g., Jessica Calefati, Obama Budgets for Changes to NCLB, MOTHER JONES,
Feb. 2, 2010, http://motherjones.cOm/mOjO/20io/02/obamas-budget-proposes-
changes-nclb (noting that NCLB led to the creation of a race to the bottom which
caused states to "dumb down" standards).
80. See, e.g., VICTOR BANDEIRA DE MELLO ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., MAPPING
STATE PROFICIENCY STANDARDS ONTO NAEP SCALES: 2005-2007 (2009), available
at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/studies/2oo456.pdf (mapping NCLB
proficiency standards on state standardized tests to the standards on the NAEP
and finding that the state standards vary widely in their rigor).
81. REBELL, supra note 1, at 6. Not all state courts necessarily would use this standard
to assess the constitutionality of output-based measures. Courts, however, should
have the freedom to gauge the adequacy of output-based measures based on the
goals of each state's education clause.
82. Calefati, supra note 79. This, in fact, is the standard Secretary of Education Arne
Duncan wishes to apply in the next reauthorization of No Child Left Behind. See
id. ("Duncan hopes to replace this broken accountability system with one that
measures whether schools are preparing students to graduate high school 'college
and career-ready,' he said, a process that begins by maintaining students' grade-
appropriate reading levels in elementary school.").
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highly influential. As courthouses and statehouses continue to grapple with the
challenge of reforming school finance systems, the healthy debate promoted by
these and similar books will move us down the path to ensuring adequate edu-
cational opportunities for all children.
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